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CIVIL PROCEDURE-IN FORMA PAUPERIS EMPLOYMENT DIS­
CRIMINATION PLAINTIFFS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: Es­
CAPING THE IS(c) TRAP 
INTRODUCTION 
An individual alleging employment discrimination against the 
federal government is faced with an extremely short limitations period 
when attempting to obtain relief by filing a civil action.} Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes a thirty-day time limit in 
which an action must be filed and requires that the proper defendant 
in such a suit be the "head ~f the department, agency, or unit, as ap­
propriate."2 The short limitations period, combined with the necessity 
for specificity in naming the appropriate defendant, presents particular 
peril to the person who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. 3 A 
pro se plaintiff is often not aware that the head of the agency must be 
the named defendant and errs by naming the agency or department 
itself.4 Once the plaintiff learns of the error, he or she will attempt to 
amend the complaint to correct the name of the defendant in an effort 
to continue the suit.S If the amendment is attempted after the expira­
tion of the thirty-day limitations period, courts are required to apply 
the relation back provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure IS(c).6 
The amendment will be allowed to relate back to the original filing 
date if it meets the four-pronged test developed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Schiavone v. Fortune. 7 The "linchpin" of relation 
back is notice. 8 Notice of the suit must have been received before the 
1. See Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988). 
2. Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 
241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988». 
3. See. e.g., Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, lIO S. Ct. 54 (1989). 
4. See. e.g., Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d lI56, lI57-58 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476; Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 80 (7th Cir. 
1987). 
5. Warren, 867 F.2d 1156; Johnson, 861 F.2d 1475; Paulk, 830 F.2d 79. 
6. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 22 (1986). For the text of Rule 15(c), see 
infra note 48. 
7. 477 U.S. 21 (1986). For the text of the four-prong test, see infra text accompany­
ing note 67. 
8. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 31. 
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limitations period has expired.9 
Since the Schiavone decision, the United States courts of appeals 
have developed differing approaches regarding the application of Rule 
lS(c) to amended complaints filed by employment discrimination 
plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis against the federal govern­
ment. lO A principal issue in these cases has been whether the statutory 
limitations period will be tolled or held in abeyance when the plaintiff 
attempts to correct the name of the defendant after the expiration of 
the period. 11 The doctrine of tolling is a judicially-created exception 
to statutory limitations periods based upon equity. The use of equita­
ble tolling often conflicts with the purpose of statutes of limitations, 
which are designed to protect defendants from stale claims even 
though these claims may be just. 12 Accordingly, the judiciary is hesi­
tant to toll a statutory limitations period and substitute its view for 
that of the legislature. Nonetheless, due to a wide degree of judicial 
discretion, the courts still use tolling where "the interests of justice 
require vindication of the plaintiff's rights."13 
Application of equitable tolling in this area is further complicated 
by the provisions of the federal in forma pauperis statute which re­
quires that the district court and the United States Marshal's Service 
effect all service. 14 This requirement forces the plaintiff to rely on the 
court to properly and promptly complete service. 
This Comment will discuss the interaction between Title VII,ls 
the in forma pauperis statute,16 the relation back provisions of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure lS(c),17 and the doctrine of equitable tolling. 
This Comment will address how this interaction may result in a litiga­
tion "trap"18 for the Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff proceeding 
9. Id. (citing 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1489, at 250 (Supp. 1986». 
10. Soto v. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III 
.S. Ct. 679 (1991); Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989); Johnson 
v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 
(1989); Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk v. Department 
of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987). 
11. See cases cited supra note 10. 
12. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348­
49 (1944). 
13. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). 
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988). 
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to -16 (1988). 
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). 
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). 
18. See Gonzales v. Secretary of Air Force, 824 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(Brown, J., dissenting) ("The majority's characterization of § 2000e-16(c) and Rule 15(c) 
as traps to frustrate a citizen in his quest to vindicate his civil right is contrary to the spirit 
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against the federal government. As background, Section I of this 
Comment will outline the applicable requirements of Title VII and the 
in forma pauperis statute. Section I will also discuss the decision in 
Schiavone v. Fortune,19 and the standards for relation back under Rule 
15(c). 
Section II presents decisions of the United States courts of ap­
peals regarding equitable tolling as it relates to the Title VII, in forma 
pauperis plaintiff. Section III discusses the general concept of the doc­
trine of equitable tolling and presents an outline for application of the 
doctrine. Section III then reviews the decisions of the courts of ap­
peals in light of this analytic framework. 
Section IV critiques the use of equitable tolling as a means of al­
lowing relation back of amended pleadings in Title VII cases. Section 
IV then proposes options which would lessen the need of a Title VII, 
in forma pauperis plaintiff to resort to the doctrine of equitable tolling 
as a means of escaping the Rule 15(c) trap. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Title VII Procedural Requirements for Civil Suit 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment 
discrimination by the federal government on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin.20 To pursue a discrimination claim, an 
aggrieved individual must first pursue available administrative reme­
dies.21 If such remedies prove unsuccessful, an individual may bring a 
of our civil rights laws and the aspirations of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988); 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1502, at 167 (1990) (''The 1966 amendment [to 
Rule 15(c)] should have the desirable effect of facilitating a citizen's suit against his sover­
eign by eliminating an unnecessary trap for the unwary."). 
19. 477 U.S. 21 (1986). 
20. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 717(a) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1988». The federal government includes the United States Postal 
Service. Id. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 similarly prohibits discrimination based on 
physical handicap. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 501, 87 Stat. 
355, 390 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988». 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1988). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis­
sion ("EEOC") is charged by Congress with the general administration of Title VII. Id. 
§ 2000e-4, -5. Regulations promulgated by the EEOC require federal employees alleging 
prohibited employment discrimination to first pursue processing of their complaint through 
the internal procedures of their own agency or department. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214 (1990). 
After final disposition by the agency, the employee may pursue the claim to the EEOC or 
to federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1988). For a general discussion of administra­
tive remedies under Title VII, see L. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
§ 2.7, at 216-26 (2d ed. 1988). 
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civil action against the offending federal agency or department within 
thirty days after receipt of a notice of final administrative action.22 
Receipt of this notice, known as a right-to-sue letter,23 begins the 
thirty-day period for filing suit. 24 
If an individual decides to sue, he or she must commence the ac­
tion by filing a complaint with the appropriate federal district court. 25 
To satisfy the statute of limitations period, the complaint must be filed 
with the court before the expiration of the thirty-day period.26 For 
any subsequent amended pleadings to relate back to the date of the 
original filing, the service of process must issue and be received by the 
proper defendant within the thirty days after the plaintiff received his 
right-to-sue letter.27 Generally, courts have read literally the require­
ment for naming the proper defendant, thus making it imperative that 
the plaintiff name the appropriate party.28 However, it is not uncom­
mon for the pro se plaintiff to name the wrong defendant. During the 
pursuit of Title VII administrative remedies, it is usually the agency 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988). The statute states: 
Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, 
agency, or unit ... or by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission upon 
an appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on a 
complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national ori­
gin, ... or after one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial charge 
with the department, agency, or unit or with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission on appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or 
unit until such time as final action may be taken by a department, agency, or unit, 
an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of 
his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a 
civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the 
head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant. 
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 governs all civil actions brought under Title VII. The Rehabilita­
tion Act of 1973 makes the remedies of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 available to persons claiming 
discrimination on the basis of handicap. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1988). Accordingly, the 
procedural requirements of Title VII also apply to claims brought under the Rehabilitation 
Act. Id. 
23. Baldwiri County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 (1984) (per 
curiam). 
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988). 
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988). 
27. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986); FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). For further 
discussion of this requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 58-74. 
28. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156,1159 (8th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. 
United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1478 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 
(1989); Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk V. 
Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79,81 (7th Cir. 1987); Williams v. Army & Air Force 
Exch. Serv., 830 F.2d 27, 28 (3d Cir. 1987); McGuinness v. United States Postal Serv., 744 
F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (7th Cir. 1984); Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 
715,717 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985). 
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rather than the agency head who is the named defendant and who 
responds to the charge. 29 
B. Proceeding In Forma Pauperis 
An aggrieved individual without sufficient assets to finance litiga­
tion may attempt to proceed in forma pauperis.30 The in forma 
pauperis statute allows persons unable to afford the cost of litigation to 
file civil actions in the federal courts without payment of fees or costs 
and to request appointment of counsel by the COurt.31 Pursuant to the 
statute, such simultaneous requests must be accompanied by an affida­
vit of poverty to the appropriate federal court including a statement of 
29. See L. MODJESKA, supra note 21, § 2.7, at 219-21. Perhaps employees name the 
agency rather than the agency head as the defendant because employees generally consider 
the agency to be their employer, rather than the individual who is the agency head. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 113 F.R.D. 73, 77 (D. Colo. 1986), aff'd, 861 
F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). See supra note 21 for a 
discussion of the administrative process. 
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). 
31. Id. The cases discussed in this Comment involve the use of the federal in forma 
pauperis statute in Title VII cases. However, Title VII also independently provides for a 
waiver of fees and the appointment of counsel. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988). At least one 
court has ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not apply to requests for counsel under Title VII 
and that instead, the provisions of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), apply exclusively. 
Edmonds v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 315 F. Supp. 523, 525 (D. Kan. 1970). Other 
courts (based upon their silence on this matter) have apparently found by implication that a 
Title VII plaintiff may proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 rather than under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f). See, e.g., Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 54 (1989); Mondyv. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk v. 
Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987). For a discussion of these cases, see 
infra notes 75-166 and accompanying text. 
There appears to be little or no precedent regarding the circumstances in which coun­
sel will be appointed in the case of a civil in forma pauperis proceeding. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is the only circuit to have published a hand­
book containing a procedure regarding these cases. UNITED STATES CoURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CIRCUIT, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL 
PROCEDURES ch. VI (1987) [hereinafter CoURT OF APPEALS HANDBOOK], reprinted in 
D.C. FEDERAL CoURTS HANDBOOK § 1.331, at 149-54 (S. Glasser & A. Glasser eds. 
1990). This handbook states in relevant part: 
The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, does not provide for the ap­
pointment of counsel in non-criminal cases. Thus, even though a party in a civil 
appeal may be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, counsel will not ordi­
narily be provided by the [c]ourt. The appellant may file a motion for the ap­
pointment of counsel. If the [c]ourt grants the motion, it may refer the appellant 
to a legal aid organization, or a law school clinical program, or it may appoint a 
private attorney who has indicated a willingness to serve without compensation in 
non-criminal cases. 
CoURT OF ApPEALS HANDBOOK, supra, at 29, reprinted in D.C. FEDERAL CoURTS HAND­
BOOK, supra, at 151. 
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the nature of the action and the entitlement to relief.32 The court may 
dismiss the application if it deems that the affidavit of poverty contains 
false statements or that the action is frivolous or malicious.33 
Once a party has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, 
differences exist among the courts of appeals as to when and whether a 
court will authorize issuance of a complaint.34 A court must deter­
mine whether the plaintiff meets the initial requirements to proceed in 
forma pauperis.3S To meet these requirements, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate indigency.36 The court must then decide whether the 
plaintiff's action is frivolous. 37 
Two approaches have developed regarding when courts make this 
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). The statute states in relevant part: 
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prose­
cution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal 
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person 
who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor. 
Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's 
belief that he is entitled to redress. 
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in 
writing that it is not taken in good faith. 
(c) The officers ofthe court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all 
duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the same reme­
dies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases. 
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable 
to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, 
or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. 
Id. 
Courts and commentators have noted that the statute balances an indigent's right to 
have access to the judicial system against the potential for abuse because the statute explic­
itly permits the court to dismiss frivolous claims. See Jones v. Morris, 777 F.2d 1277, 1279 
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986); Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784 
(11th Cir. 1984); Catz & Guyer, Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In Search ofJudi­
cial Standards, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 655 (1978); Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: 
The In Forma Pauperis Statute-Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 413 (1985); 
Note, Petitions to Sue In Forma Pauperis In Federal Courts: Standards and Procedures for 
the Exercise of Judicial Discretion, 56 B.U.L. REv. 745 (1976). 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988). The federal in forma pauperis statute is notably 
lacking in specific guidelines and procedures to govern the federal courts in considering 
motions to proceed in forma pauperis. For commentary on this issue, see Catz & Guyer, 
supra note 32; Note, supra note 32. 
34. Note, supra note 32, at 753-54. The discussion in this Comment relates to 
problems arising due to the varying approaches of the United States courts of appeals re­
garding the issuance of a complaint. The case law is relatively silent about standards to be 
used relative to the appointment of counsel in civil proceedings. See supra note 31. 
35. McCone v. Holiday Inn Convention Center, 797 F.2d 853, 854 (10th Cir. 1986). 
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988). 
37. Id. 
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determination of the seriousness of the action.38 Under the first alter­
native, the court will consider before the docketing of the complaint 
whether or not the petition is frivolous based solely on consideration 
of the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.39 Alternatively, the court 
will allow the plaintiff's complaint to be docketed, postponing consid­
eration as to whether or not the claim is frivolous.40 If the court opts 
for the second alternative, it may authorize issuance of service imme­
diately upon filing,41 or it may postpone service of process until after it 
considers whether or not the complaint is frivolous.42 
For a plaintiff facing the thirty-day limitations period of Title 
VII, the effect is the same whether the court postpones granting the in 
forma pauperis motion until after docketing of the complaint or 
whether it dismisses the action before docketing and service.43 In 
either case, the delay may preclude notice of the suit to the appropri­
ate parties during the thirty-day limitations period. Insufficient notice 
during the limitations period may preclude relation back under Rule 
15(c) of any amended complaint and result in dismissal of the action.44 
Once a court has granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, it is 
the responsibility of the United States Marshal to serve the summons 
and complaint on behalf of the plaintiff.4s If service is to be made 
upon the United States government it must be done in accordance 
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4) which requires service 
upon the appropriate United States Attorney and the United States 
Attorney General.46 
38. 	 Note, supra note 32, at 753-54. 
39. 	 Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1987). 
40. 	 McCone v. Holiday Inn Convention Center, 797 F.2d 853, 854 (1Oth Cir. 1986). 
41. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(a) ("Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith 
issue a summons ...."); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) ("The summons and complaint shall be 
served together."). 
42. 	 McCone, 797 F.2d at 854. 
43. See Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1476, 1478 (10th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989); Paulk, 830 F.2d at 80 n.l, 81. 
44. For a discussion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), see infra text accom­
panying notes 48-74. 
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2)(B)(i); see a/so Rochon V. 
Dawson, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[A] plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis 
is entitled to rely upon service by the U.S. Marshals ...."). Normally service of summons 
and complaint shall "be served by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 
years of age." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2)(A). The Rule specifies the narrow circumstances 
where the United States Marshal is required to effect service. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2)(B). 
46. 	 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4). The Rule states that service shall be made: 
Upon the United States, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the 
complaint to the United States attorney for the district in which the action is 
brought or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated 
by the United States attorney in a writing filed with the clerk of the court and by 
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C. 	 The Necessity of Naming the Proper Defendant: The Standards 
for Relation Back and Schiavone v. Fortune 
Problems arise when a plaintiff has erred under the second re­
quirement of Title VII and has named and served the wrong defendant 
within the thirty-day limitations period. Once the court has notified 
the plaintiff of this error, he or she will normally attempt to amend the 
complaint in order to name the proper defendant.47 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure determine the standards 
required to allow parties to amend their pleadings during the course of 
litigation. Rule IS(c) states the criteria for determining whether or 
not an amended pleading will relate back to the date of the original 
pleading in order to satisfy any requisite limitations period.48 The 
Rule allows the addition of both parties and claims.49 
In 1966, Rule IS(c) was amended to indicate the standards to be 
applied when an amendment changes the name of the defendant and 
sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified 
mail to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of 
Columbia, and in any action attacking the validity of an order of an officer or 
agency of the United States not made a party, by also sending a copy of the 
summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to such officer or 
agency. 
Id. 
47. Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk, 830 
F.2d at 81. 
48. 	 FED. R. CIV. P. IS(c). The Rule states: 
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of 
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original. 
pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted 
relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided 
by law for commencing the action against the party to be brought in by amend­
ment, that party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that 
the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) 
knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party, the action would have been brought against the party. 
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or the 
United States Attorney's designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, 
or an agency or officer who would have been a proper defendant if named, satis­
fies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with respect to the United States 
or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant. 
Id. 
Accordingly, an amendment that relates back will be treated as having been filed as of 
the date of the original complaint. If relation back is allowed, the amended complaint will 
not be subject to attack on the basis of a statute of limitations. 
49. Id. The addition of a claim will generally be allowed where the pleading has 
been timely filed and served on the proper party. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 
(1986). See infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schiavone and the 
requirements for relation back under Rule 15(c). 
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to allow imputed notice of an action to a federal agency or officer 
when service is made upon the United States Attorney or Attorney 
General.50 The Advisory Committee Notes which accompanied these 
additions indicated that the problem of amended pleadings changing 
the name of the party defendant "ha[d] arisen most acutely in certain 
actions by private parties against officers or agencies of the United 
States."5 I The Advisory Committee also discussed several cases where 
Social Security claimants had mistakenly named "the United States, 
the Department of HEW, the 'Federal Security Administration' (a 
nonexistent agency), and a Secretary who had retired from the office 
. . . . "52 After the expiration of the requisite limitations period, the 
claimants attempted to amend their complaints to name the proper 
defendant, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 53 The 
motions to amend were denied on the basis that they amounted to new 
proceedings and were therefore untimely. 54 The Advisory Committee 
noted that the policy of a limitations period "would not have been 
offended by allowing relation back in the[se] situations"55 because "the 
government was put on notice of the claim within the stated period. "56 
The Advisory Committee expressly noted that, "[i]n these circum­
stances, characterization of the amendment as a new proceeding is not 
so. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c). The second and third sentences of the present rule were 
amended in 1966. For the current text of Rule 15(c), see supra note 48. 
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. (citing Cohn v. Federal Sec. Admin., 199 F. Supp. 884, 885 (W.O.N.Y. 
1961); Cunningham v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 541 (W.O. Mo. 1958); Hall v. Depart­
ment of HEW, 199 F. Supp. 833 (S.~. Tex. 1960); Sandridge v. Folsom, 200 F. Supp. 25 
(M.D. Tenn. 1959». 
55. Id. 
56. Id. In a critique of Rule 15(c) and Schiavone, Professor Robert Brussack sug­
gested that the Advisory Committee was perhaps tnistaken in its assumption that the gov­
ernment received notice before expiration of the limitations period. Brussack, Outrageous 
Fortune: The Case for Amending Rule 15(c) Again, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 671, 681 (1988). 
For additional commentary on Rule 15(c) since Schiavone, see Bauer, Schiavone· An Un­
Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court's Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 720 (1988); Epter, An Un-Fortune-Ate Decision: 
The Aftermath of the Supreme Court's Eradication of the Relation-Back Doctrine, 17 FLA. 
ST. U.L. REV. 713 (1990); Lewis, The Excessive History ofFederal Rule 15(c) and its Les­
sons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1507 (1987); Note, Schiavone v. Fortune: 
A Clarification ofthe Relation Back Doctrine, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 499 (1987); Note, Schia­
vone v. Fortune: Notice Becomes a Threshold Requirement for Relation Back Under Fed­
eral Rule 15(c), 65 N.C.L. REv. 598 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Threshold Requirement]; 
Note, Looking Forward: A Fairer Application of the Relation Back Provisions of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 131 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Looking 
Forward]. See infra notes 295-303 and accompanying text for further discussion of the 
Brussack article. 
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responsive to the reality, but is merely question-begging; and to deny 
relation back is to defeat unjustly the claimant's opportunity to prove 
his case. "S7 
The 1986 Supreme Court decision of Schiavone v. Fortune S8 ad­
dressed the application of Rule 15(c) "to a less-than-precise denomina­
tion of a defendant in complaints filed in federal court near the 
expiration of the period of limitations."s9 In Schiavone, three parties 
alleging defamation filed suit in federal district court against Fortune 
magazine.60 Each complaint named Fortune as the defendant.61 The 
named defendant should have been Time, Inc., the publisher of For­
tune magazine.62 After expiration of a one-year limitations period, the 
plaintiffs amended their complaints to name "Fortune, also known as 
Time, Incorporated" as the defendant. 63 Time, Inc. alleged that it had 
not received notice of the suit within the limitations period, and there­
fore, the amendments could not relate back under Rule 15(c) to the 
original date of filing against Fortune. 64 
The Court agreed with Time, Inc. and refused to allow the 
amended complaints to relate back to the date of the original plead­
ings.6S In its decision, the Court set out a four-part test to determine 
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note (citing Byse, Suing the "Wrong" 
Defendant in Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Proposals for Reform, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1963». In this influential article, Byse essentially suggested the amend­
ments to Rule 15(c) which were subsequently adopted in 1966. Id. For a discussion of the 
Byse article and the 1966 amendments in light of Schiavone, see Brussack, supra note 56. 
58. 477 U.S. 21 (1986). 
59. Id. at 22. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 22-23. 
62. Id. at 23. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 24. The magazine containing the alleged defamation had a pUblication 
date of May 31, 1982. Id. at 22. The Schiavone petitioners filed their complaints on May 9, 
1983, and mailed the complaints to Time's agent on May 20, 1983. Id. at 22-23. Time 
received the complaints on May 23, 1983, but refused service because Time was not named 
as the defendant. Id. at 23. On July 18, 1983, the petitioners attempted to amend their 
complaints naming Time, Inc. as the defendant. Id. While the district court did not rule 
on this issue, the court of appeals found that substantial distribution of the magazine took 
place on May 19, 1982. /d. at 25. Accordingly, no service was attempted upon any party 
prior to the expiration of the limitations period on May 19, 1983. Id. at 29. 
65. Id. at 27. The Schiavone decision attempted to resolve the conflict among the 
courts of appeals regarding the issue of relation back. Id. at 22. The conflict was between a 
strict construction of Rule 15(c), as adopted by Schiavone, and a more liberal standard 
which allowed relation back when a new party defendant was named after expiration of a 
limitations period. Compare Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982) (no 
relation back where plaintiff originally named the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
United States Department of Justice and later attempted to amend the complaint to prop­
erly name the United States) and Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1984) 
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whether an amendment will be permitted under Rule 15(c).66 The 
Court stated: 
Relation back is dependent upon four factors, all of which must be 
satisfied: (1) the basic claim must have arisen out ofthe conduct set 
forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must 
have received such notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintain­
ing its defense; (3) that party must or should have known that, but 
for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been 
brought against it; and (4) the second and third requirements must 
have been fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period. 67 
The Court determined that notice to Time, Inc. had occurred af­
ter the end of the limitations period as no party had received notice 
before the end of one year.68 The amended complaint, therefore, failed 
to satisfy the fourth requirement of the test. 69 In support of this con­
clusion, the Court in Schiavone relied upon the 1966 Advisory Com­
mittee's Notes to the Rule 15(c) amendments.70 
The Court noted that the Advisory Committee would also require 
notice within the limitations period to the party brought in by the 
amendment.71 The Court dismissed the plaintiffs' contention that 
Rule 15(c) should be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4, which requires service of the summons within 120 days 
(no relation back where plaintiff originally named a John Doe defendant and later at­
tempted to amend the complaint identifying the defendant) with Ingram v. Kumar, SSS 
F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978) (court allowed relation back where plaintiff amended the complaint 
to change middle initial of defendant which also entailed notice to an entirely different 
party), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979) and Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 
19S0) (court allowed relation back where plaintiff originally sued sheriff's office and 
amended complaint to name the sheriff as an individual). 
66. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 29. This four-part test is essentially a restatement of the 
elements of Rule 15(c). 
67. Id. 

6S. Id. at 30. 

69. Id. The Court also discussed an "identity-of-interest" exception developed by 
some ofthe courts of appeals to allow relation back where another defendant is named after 
the expiration of the limitations period. Id. at 28-29. The exception provides that "[t]imely 
filing of a complaint, and notice within the limitations period to the party named in the 
complaint, permit imputation of notice to a subsequently named and sufficiently related 
party" and would, if allowed, arguably satisfy the third factor of the four-part test. Id. at 
29. The Court did not apply the exception, stating that since neither Time, Inc. nor For­
tune had received notice until after the expiration of the limitations period, no timely notice 
could be imputed to Time. Id. (citing Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 
102-03 (1st Cir. 1979); Norton v. International Harvester Co., 627 F.2d IS, 20-21 (7th Cir. 
19S0». For a discussion of the identity-of-interest exception and Schiavone, see Note, 
Threshold Requirement, supra note 56. 
70. Schiavone, 417 U.S. at 30-31. 
71. Id. at 31. 
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. after filing the complaint.72 Focusing on the history of the amendment 
rather than the literal wording of the Rule, the plaintiffs had alleged 
that Rule IS(c) was amended in 1966 "for the express purpose of al­
lowing relation back of a change in the name or identity of a defendant 
when, although the limitations period for filing had run, the period 
allowed by Rule 4 for timely service had not yet expired."73 The 
Court rejected this argument stating that Rule 4 deals only with pro­
cess, or the time allowed "for the service of a timely filed complaint," 
whereas the emphasis of Rule 1 S(c) is upon the commencement of the 
action, noting that it is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 that defines 
commencement of the action. 74 
II. 	 JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF EQUITABLE TOLLING AND 
RELATION BACK 
The strict reading given to Rule 1S(c) by the United States 
Supreme Court in Schiavone has resurrected the problems presumably 
addressed by the 1966 amendments to the Rule.7s The Court's con­
struction of Rule IS(c) "leaves potentially meritorious claims unjustifi­
ably vulnerable to the limitations defense on account of easily made 
pleading mistakes."76 The following Section introduces five cases in 
which courts have addressed the issue of equitable tolling of the stat­
ute of limitations where a Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff, at­
tempting to sue the federal government, has not named the proper 
defendant during the limitations period. In each case, the plaintiff at­
tempted to amend his or her complaint to correct the name of the 
defendant pursuant to the relation back provisions of Rule IS(c).77 In 
two cases, the court refused to allow the amendment,78 while in the 
other three cases, the plaintiffs were allowed to amend their com­
plaints by naming the proper parties.79 
72. Id. at 30; FED. R. CIY. 	P. 4(j). 
73. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 26 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 5). 
74. Id. at 30; FED. R. CIv. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint 
with the court."). 
75. See generally Brussack, supra note 56. 
76. Id. at 672. 
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). 
78. Soto v. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III 
S. Ct. 679 (1991); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). 
79. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989); Mondy v. Secre­
tary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 
79 (7th Cir. 1987). 
237 1991] ESCAPING THE J5(c) TRAP 
A. No Equitable Tolling to Allow Relation Back 
1. Johnson v. United States Postal Service 
In Johnson v. United States Postal Service,80 a pro se plaintiff al­
leging employment discrimination filed a motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis five days after receiving a right to sue letter from the 
EEOC.81 Four days later, the district court granted the plaintiff's mo­
tion to proceed in forma pauperis, but denied the appointment of 
counsel.82 On the final day of the thirty-day limitations period, the 
plaintiff, proceeding without an attorney, filed his complaint, naming 
the Postal Service as the defendant83 rather than the Postmaster Gen­
eral, as the statute required.84 The district court then directed the 
United States Marshal to serve the complaint and summons.8S Service 
was not effected on the Postal Service until several days later.86 The 
United States Marshal did not serve the appropriate United States At­
torney or the Attorney General, as required under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.87 Five months later, the district court issued an 
order to show cause why service was incomplete.88 The plaintiff then 
obtained an attorney and served the United States Attorney and the 
United States Attorney General.89 The Postal Service moved for dis­
missal based upon the plaintiff's failure to name the proper defend­
ant.90 The trial court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had 
not named or served the correct party and thus, could not amend his 
80. 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). 
81. Id. at 1476. The plaintiff had been dismissed from his position as a bulk mail 
handler allegedly due to a disability of his right foot. Id. Accordingly, the basis for his 
complaint fell under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988». Id. at 1477. This statute is governed by the limitational require­
ments of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c). See supra note 22 for the text of the statute. 
82. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476. Little authority exists regarding a court's discretion 
to grant or deny the appointment of counsel to in forma pauperis plaintiffs. See Warren v. 
Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989); Johnson, 861 F.2d 1475; Mondy, 845 
F.2d 1051; Paulk, 830 F.2d 79; Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 113 F.R.D. 73 (D. 
Colo. 1986), aff'd, 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989); Catz 
& Guyer, supra note 32; Note, Controlling and Deterring Frivolous In Forma Pauperis Com­
plaints 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1165 (1987); Note, supra note 32; see also supra note 31. 
83. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476. The plaintiff also named his local union as a defend­
ant. The claim against the union was dismissed by the district court. Id. 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988). The statute requires service upon the "head of 
the department" as the appropriate defendant. Id. For the text of this statutory provision, 
see supra note 22. 
85. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476. 
86. Id. 
87. FED. R. av. P. 4(c)(2)(B)(i), 4(d)(4), 4(d)(5). 
88. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476. 
89. Id. The plaintiff never named or served the Postmaster General. Id. at 1478. 
90. Id. at 1477. 
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complaint.91 Accordingly, the matter was dismissed for lack of sub­
ject matter jurisdiction.92 
In Johnson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir­
cuit affirmed the decision of the trial court93 and upheld summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant.94 In so doing, the court would not 
allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to name the proper defend­
ant. The Johnson majority ruled that an amendment would not meet 
the fourth criteria of the test outlined in Schiavone v. Fortune,9S finding 
that no notice of the suit had been given to the defendant during the 
limitations period.96 The plaintiff argued that he was dependent upon 
the United States Marshal for service on both the named defendant 
and, pursuant to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
4, the United States Attorney and the Attorney General.97 
91. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 113 F.R.D. 73, 74, 77 (D. Colo. 1986), 
aff'd, 861 F.2d 1475 (lOth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). 
92. Id. 
93. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1480 & n.5 (citing Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986»; see supra text 
accompanying notes 58-74. 
96. Id. at 1480. The Johnson majority also rejected application of the identity-of­
interest exception noting that there was no "notice within the limitations period." Id. at 
1481-82. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of the identity-of-interest ex­
ception in Schiavone, see supra note 69. 
97. Id. at 1480-81. For the text of Rule 4(d)(4), see supra note 46. Rule 15(c) pro­
vides that service upon the United States Attorney or the Attorney General constitutes 
sufficient notice of an action to allow relation back with respect to suits against the United 
States or any of its agencies or officers. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). For the text of Rule 15(c), 
see supra note 48. Although this second paragraph of the Rule appears to be as "plain" in 
its meaning as the first paragraph (Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986», at least 
one court has chosen to ignore this section of 15(c). Stewart v. United States Postal Serv., 
649 F. Supp. 1531 (S.D. N.Y. 1986). In Stewart, a pro se plaintiff, alleging employment 
discrimination under Title VII, received an extension of time for service of his complaint 
from the district court. Id. at 1532. The plaintiff properly served the United States Attor­
ney and the Attorney General within the extended period but did not serve the Postmaster 
General. Id. at 1533. The court did not apply or discuss the provisions of Rule 15(c) 
allowing substitute service on the Attorney General or the United States Attorney. In­
stead, the court strictly applied 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-16, citing Brown v. General Services 
Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976). In Brown, the Supreme Court ruled that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-16 is the "exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress 
of federal employment discrimination." Brown, 425 U.S. at 829. The Stewart court, there­
fore, concluded that the plaintiff had to serve the Postmaster General during the thirty days 
in order to allow the relation back of amendments. Stewart, 649 F. Supp. at 1533. None of 
the United States courts of appeals have followed this interpretation. Reliance on Brown in 
this respect appears to be somewhat misguided. The essential holding of Brown was that 
other remedies for employment discrimination available at the time of enactment of 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-16 in 1972 were preempted by this amendment which allowed suits against 
federal defendants. Brown, 425 U.S. at 829. Brown is silent regarding the application of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the statute. 
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The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that his problem was 
caused by the Marshal's inadequate service,98 and blamed the failure 
of service upon "the inadequacy of the plaintiff's complaint"99 since it 
was filed on the last day of the limitations period. The court found 
that the Marshal was not at fault as the service was within the 120 
days permissible under Rule 4(j).IOO The court noted that even if the 
United States Attorney or Attorney General had been served by the 
Marshal in accordance with Rule 4(d) at the time of Mr. Johnson's 
filing, service still would have been inadequate unless it had been ef­
fected on the day of filing. 101 In addition, the court rejected the plain­
tiff's contention that the thirty-day limitations period should be 
equitably tolled. loo Relying on Tenth Circuit precedent,103 the court 
acknowledged the existence of the doctrine of equitable tolling but 
stated that the limitations period would be tolled only where there had 
been some "active deception."I04 The court concluded that the plain­
tiff "was not 'lulled into inaction' in any way that [rose] to the active 
deception standard" and, therefore, the plaintiff did not present an ap­
propriate case for application of equitable tolling. lOS 
The Johnson dissent argued that this case presented sufficient evi­
dence to allow the court to exercise its general power to equitably toll 
the statute of limitations period, and that relation back under Rule 
98. 	 Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1480. 
99. 	 Id. 
100. 	 Id. The Rule states in relevant part: 
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant 
within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf 
such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not 
made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant with­
out prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon 
motion. 
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(j). 
101. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1480. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1481 (citing Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 1984); 
Gonzalez-Aller Ba1seyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1983». 
104. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1481. 
105. Id. Another issue regarding equitable tolling in suits against the federal govern­
ment is whether Title VII's time limits are jurisdictional or limitational. If the time periods 
are viewed as jurisdictional, the strict thirty-day limit for filing and service must be met as a 
prerequisite to suit. Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 81 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(citing Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1984». However, if the limits are viewed 
as limitational, they are then subject to "waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. 
Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). In a recent Title VII decision, the United 
States Supreme Court resolved this issue and held that "the same rebuttable presumption of 
equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits 
against the United States." Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 457 (1990). For a 
discussion of Irwin, see infra notes 215-26 and accompanying text. 
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15(c) should have'been allowed. 106 The dissent proposed that once the 
court granted the in forma pauperis motion, the court "was required 
by federal law to properly serve [the] defendant."I07 The dissent rea­
soned, that this resulted in "reasonable reliance [by the plaintift] on the 
process authorized by statute and implemented by officers of the 
COurt"108 and that, therefore, the plaintiff was actually "lulled into in­
action."I09 In addition, the dissent argued that the provisions ofthe in 
forma pauperis statute, which direct that the court, via the United 
States Marshal, serve process and "perform all duties" on behalf of the 
plaintiff,110 "impose[] a special duty upon officers of the court to assist 
impecunious and generally unsophisticated plaintiffs to navigate safely 
through the procedural maze created by applicable statutes and 
rules."111 
The dissent would have excused the plaintiff's delay in filing the 
complaint and rejected the majority's position that the Marshal was' 
excused from failure to effect timely service. The dissent disagreed 
with the majority's argument that the plaintiff's failure to file the com­
plaint until the final day of the limitations period and the 120-day pe­
riod of Rule 4 for service excused the Marshal from failure to effect 
timely service. 112 The dissent argued that "a plaintiff could be com­
pletely out of court even though the Marshal proceeded within the 
time limit permitted by [Rule 4(j)]."113 The dissent noted that even if 
the plaintiff's complaint had been filed within one week of the court's 
denial of the motion for appointment of counsel (instead of the actual 
twenty-one days), "the Marshal would still have the same 120 days 
within which to act."114 Therefore, the plaintiff would still be unable 
106. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1482-89 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
107. /d. at 1486. 
108. Id. The dissent further stated: 

The majority draws an artificial distinction between circumstances where one 

party is explicitly told something that leads to the forfeiting of rights and situa­

tions such as the present one where reliance on a court order is not deemed overt 
enough to qualify. I respectfully submit that there is no principled basis for that 
distinction. The issue is reliance and how that reliance is fostered, regardless of 
the method employed. This is especially true when dealing with an unsophistica­
ted plaintiff such as Mr. Johnson. 
Id. at 1487. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1486 (citing 29 [sic] U.S.C. § 1915(c». For the full text of the in forma 
pauperis statute, see supra note 32. 
111. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1486. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1486 n.lO. 
114. /d. at 1486. The dissent noted that the record revealed no evidence of undue 
delay by the plaintiff in filing his complaint. Id. In a separate argument, the dissent pro­
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to present his claim even if service was effected by the Marshal in com­
pliance with Rule 4 with a reasonable delay of "fifteen or twenty days 
after the complaint was filed." I IS The dissent further argued that this 
outcome rose to an " 'active deception' which 'in some extraordinary 
way [prevents [a] plaintift] from asserting his or her rights,''' and 
should result in equitable tolling,116 
2. Soto v. United States Postal Service 
In Soto v. United States Postal Service,1l7 a case similar to John­
son, a party alleging employment discrimination by the Postal Service 
filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint in the 
form of a letter, thirty days after receiving a right-ta-sue letter from 
the EEOC. I 18 The United States District Court for the District of Pu­
erto Rico granted the motion.1l9 The complaint was officially dock­
eted thirty-five days after receipt of the right-ta-sue letter.l20 The 
Postal Service and the United States Attorney in San Juan received 
process approximately five months later,121 The Postal Service moved 
for dismissal of the complaint and the plaintiff, having obtained coun­
sel, filed a motion to amend naming the proper defendant.122 The dis­
trict court adopted the recommendations of a magistrate who found 
that Schiavone barred the plaintiff's attempt to amend. 123 The district 
court further found that the circumstances did not warrant the appli­
posed that timely notice to the Postmaster General could be imputed from notice to the 
United States Postal Service under the identity-<>f-interest exception, thus satisfying the 
third factor of Schiavone's four-part test. Id. at 1488-89. Citing the dissent in Gonzales v. 
Secretary of Air Force, 824 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1987) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 
485 U.S. 969 (1988), the Johnson dissent argued that the head of an agency and the agency 
itself are functionally the same for the purposes of defending a Title VII suit. Johnson, 861 
F.2d at 1488-89 (McKay, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinions in Johnson and Gonzales 
both argued that the same people within the agency or department receive notice of the 
suit, appear in court, prepare all pleadings, etc., regardless of whether the agency head or 
the agency itself is named. Id. For a discussion of the Johnson majority's position on the 
identity-<>f-interest exception and the Schiavone discussion on identity-<>f-interest, see supra 
notes 96 & 69, respectively. For the text of the Schiavone four-factor relation back test, see 
supra text accompanying note 67. 
115. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1486 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
116. Id. at 1486 n.lO. 
117. 905 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 679 (1991). 
118. Id. at 539. If the court had accepted the letter as the complaint and had dock­
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cation of equitable tolling. l24 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit adopted 
the district court's findings. The court of appeals relied heavily upon 
the plaintiff's failure to file his complaint until the final day of the 
limitations period. l2S The court found that the plain meaning of Rule 
lS(c) "may not be tempered merely by the elements of hardship and 
sympathy."l26 The court noted that plaintiff Soto's claim was 
"doomed from the outset, because only virtually instantaneous service 
would have preserved his ability to later amend to add the proper 
party."l27 The court declined to equitably toll the limitations period 
finding that there was no "affirmative showing" of inequity which 
would justify tolling. l28 
The decision rejected the plaintiff's contention that the right-to­
sue letter was confusing, noting that it was apparent from the context 
of the letter that the "plaintiff must name the head of an agency or 
department."l29 The court also rejected the plaintiff's arguments that 
equity should allow tolling as he was proceeding pro se and because 
process did not issue in a timely manner. l30 The court noted that 
there was no active deception by any governmental party, and that it 
would have been impossible for the court to effectuate timely service 
due to the plaintiff's failure to file until the final day of the limitations 
period. 131 
The Johnson and Soto decisions present one end of a spectrum in 
which courts have declined to use equitable tolling to free Title VII, in 
forma pauperis plaintiffs from the time limitations of Rule lS(c). The 
following discussion presents three cases which represent the other 
end of the spectrum. In these cases, the equitable tolling doctrine was 
used to allow Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiffs to amend their 
complaints after expiration of the limitations period. 
B. Equitable Tolling Employed to Allow Relation Back 
In contrast to Johnson and Soto, the United States Courts of Ap­
peals for the District of Columbia,132 the Seventh Circuit l33 and the 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 539-41. 
126. Id. at 540 (citing Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986». 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 541. 




132. Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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Eighth Circuit l34 have allowed Title VII plaintiffs to proceed with 
their complaints despite untimely service on the proper defendants. 
1. Mondy v. Secretary ofArmy 
In Mondy v. Secretary ofArmy, l3S a plaintiff, proceeding in forma 
pauperis, once again named the wrong Title VII defendant in his com­
plaint. 136 Twenty-five days after receipt of his right-to-sue letter, the 
plaintiff filed his "papers" with the appropriate United States District 
Court. 137 The district court granted plaintiff Mondy's motion to pro­
ceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the case sua sponte. 138 Mondy 
then moved to alter the judgment, the district court granted the mo­
tion, and service followed. 139 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, this re­
sulted in service of the complaint almost four months after the 
expiration of the limitations period. l40 The district court dismissed 
the complaint as it had not been served upon the proper parties during 
the limitations period. 141 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia reversed, deciding that equitable tolling should 
apply.142 Noting that the judicial power to toll should be exercised 
"only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances," the 
court found that the facts of the case justified tolling due to the. plain­
tiff's right to rely on the court to effect timely service as provided by 
the in forma pauperis statute. 143 The court also noted that the plaintiff 
was diligent in filing the complaint and did not set up a "photo-finish," 
expecting same day service. l44 Accordingly, the court allowed rela­
tion back of an amended complaint correcting the name of the 
defendant.14s 
133. Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987). 
134. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989). 
135. 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
136. Id. at 1052. The plaintiff named his activity commander, rather than the Secre­
tary of the Army. Id. 
137. Id. The plaintiff received his right-ta-sue letter on September 23, 1985. Id. The 
opinion does not state the day the complaint was filed but merely indicates that the plaintiff 
"filed his papers with the court ... on October 18, 1985." Id. Presumably these "papers" 
were the motion to proceed in forma pauperis with its accompanying statement of the 
claim, which could have been deemed by the court to be the complaint. See id. at 1054. 
138. Id. at 1053 n.2. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1054. The United States Attorney was served at this time. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 1057. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
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2. Paulk v. Department ofAir Force 
In Paulk v. Department ofAir Force, 146 a pro se plaintiff proceed­
ing in forma pauperis also named the wrong defendant in a Title VII 
action against the federal government. 147 Due to the length of time 
taken by the district court in consideration of the in forma pauperis 
petition, the United States Attorney was not served with the complaint 
for more than one month after it had been filed and the limitations 
period had expired. 148 The district court did not allow the plaintiff to 
amend her complaint. It dismissed the suit because the proper defend­
ant did not receive notice of the suit within the limitations period. 149 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re­
versed this dismissal. ISO The court initially found that service upon 
the United States Attorney was sufficient to afford notice to the proper 
defendant, the Secretary of Defense. I S I In making this determination, 
the court relied upon the literal language of Rule 15(c), 152 which pro­
vides that service upon the United States Attorney or Attorney Gen­
eral constitutes sufficient notice to an officer or agency of the federal 
government to allow relation back of an amended complaint later 
naming that officer or agency as the defendant~ IS3 The court noted 
that the Advisory Committee Comments to the 1966 Amendment of 
Rule 15(c) "ma[d]e clear" that the purpose of this provision in Rule 
15(c) "was intended for precisely the situation in the present case."IS4 
More speCifically, the court stated that the amendment was designed 
"to assist groups, such as Social Security claimants, that were having 
difficulties ascertaining the proper governmental defendant."155 
The Paulk court then tolled the limitations period, concluding 
that "[s]ervice of process on the United States Attorney gave, pursuant 
to Rule 15(c), the proper federal governmental defendant notice of the 
146. 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987). 
147. Id. at 80. The plaintiff named the Department of the Air Force and not Casper 
Weinberger, Secretary of Defense. Id. The plaintiff a\leged employment discrimination on 
the basis of race. Id. The record in the case was unclear as to whether the plaintiff had 
filed her complaint and in forma pauperis petition within thirty days after her receipt of the 
right-to-sue letter. Id. at 80 n.l. The district court and the court of appeals both assumed 
that the complaint was timely filed. Id. 
148. Id. at 82. 
149. Id. at 80-81. 

ISO. Id. at 83. 

151. Id. at 82. 
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). For the text of Rule 15(c), see supra note 48. 
153. Paulk, 830 F.2d at 81-82. 
154. Id. at 81. For a general discussion of the 1966 amendments, see supra text 
accompanying notes SO-57. See also Brussack, supra note 56. 
ISS. Paulk, 830 F.2d at 83. 
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action and of the mistaken naming of the wrong governmental defend­
ant."IS6 The court noted that the period of time taken by a district 
court in consideration of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis could 
consume the entire Title VII thirty-day limitations period. ls7 There­
fore, the court decided to toll the limitations period during the pen­
dency of such motions to "allow[] 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Rule 15(c) to 
operate harmoniously, instead of denying the benefits of the 1966 
Amendment of Rule 15(c) to the very plaintiffs who are most likely to 
need it."IS8 
3. Warren v. Department ofArmy 
In Wa"en v. Department ofArmy, IS9 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also allowed tolling of the limitations 
period to correct the name of the defendant so as to allow relation 
back of an amended complaint. 160 In Wa"en, the plaintiff filed his pro 
se complaint with the district court twenty-three days after receipt of 
the right-to-sue letter.l61 On the twenty-fourth day, the plaintiff filed a 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 162 After a thirty-two day period 
for consideration, the district court denied the application.l63 The 
United States Attorney and Attorney General were served sixty-five 
days after the limitations period had expired. l64 Relying on ambigu­
ous language in the right-to-sue letter and the extreme length of time 
taken by the district court in consideration of the in forma pauperis 
motion, the court of appeals tolled the limitations period and found 
that service on the United States Attorney was sufficient to allow rela­
tion back under Rule 15(c).16S The court deemed the complaint to 
156. Id. at 82. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 83. The Paulk court also raised the concern of potential problems of 
equal protection for in forma pauperis plaintiffs, noting that because the delay in these cases 
is "solely within the control of the district court," similar claims would be treated differ­
ently with regard to relation back "only on the basis of the speed with which the court 
chose to process them." Id. (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 441-42 
(1982) (separate opinion of Blackmun, J.); Logan, 455 U.S. at 444 (powell, J., concurring in 
judgment». 
159. 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989). 
160. Id. at 1160. The plaintiff alleged that he was discriminated against because of 
his race and sex. Id. at 1157. The complaint improperly named the Department of the 
Army rather than the Secretary of Defense. Jd. at 1157-58. 
161. Id. at 1157. 
162. Id. at 1158. 
163. Id. The district court allowed the plaintiff to pay his fees on an installment 
basis. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 1160-61. 
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have been timely served on the United States Attorney and noted that 
the defendant "acted with 'utmost diligence,' only to find himself 
caught up in an arcane procedural snare."l66 
III. EsCAPING THE lS(c) TRAP 
Johnson, Soto, Mondy, Paulk, and Wa"en all demonstrate that 
the strict construction given to Rule lS(c) by the United States 
Supreme Court in Schiavone may indeed trap an in forma pauperis 
plaintiff who has mistakenly named the wrong Title VII defendant. 
These cases demonstrate that equitable tolling has been the only po­
tential method of escape enabling the plaintiff to pursue the merits of 
his or her case. In order to successfully convince a court that the limi­
tations period should be tolled, a plaintiff must first maneuver through 
several steps before he or she is allowed to present a claim before the 
court. These hurdles include an analysis as to whether equitable toll­
ing is consistent with the applicable statutes and Rules, Title VII, the 
in forma pauperis statute, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The analysis then narrows to focus on whether the plaintiff can 
demonstrate all of the following three elements: active deception or 
misrepresentation toward the plaintiff by the defendant, the court or 
the administrative agency which conducted the initial investigation; 
reliance by the plaintiff upon the court or its officers to effect proper 
service; and, diligence by the plaintiff in pursuit of the claim. 
This Section discusses generally the doctrine of equitable tolling 
and outlines the obstacles a plaintiff must overcome. The Section then 
discusses the doctrine of equitable tolling as it specifically applies to 
the Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff, using the facts presented in 
Johnson, Soto, Mondy, Paulk, and Wa"en. 167 
166. Id. at 1160 (quoting Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1112 (10th Cir. 1984». 
The Warren court also relied upon the identity-of-interest between "the Department of the 
Army and its Secretary." Id. at 1161. The court concluded that notice of the action could 
be imputed from the Department to the Secretary, thereby satisfying the third factor of the 
Schiavone four-part relation back test. Id. at 1160-61; see Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 
21, 29 (1986) (The party to be added "must or should have known that, but for a mistake 
concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it."). For a discussion of 
the tests for relation back under Rule 15(c), see supra text accompanying notes 58-74. The 
Warren court stated that it "ha[d] little doubt but that the same individual would have 
received Warren's suit papers regardless of whether the Department or its Secretary were 
named as defendant." Warren, 867 F.2d at 1160-61. 
167. This analysis concentrates on the narrow factual situation of the in forma 
pauperis plaintiff and does not specifically address cases where the plaintiff, while pro se, 
has not attempted to proceed in forma pauperis. The reason for this distinction is that a 
plaintiff who is proceeding in forma pauperis will rely more heavily upon the court and its 
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A. The Doctrine of Equitable Tolling of the Limitations Period 
The United States Supreme Court's strict interpretation of Rule 
lS(c) in Schiavone results in the dismissal of potentially meritorious 
claims when a Title VII plaintiff suing the federal government has 
named the wrong defendant during the limitations period and later 
attempts to correct the error through amendment. This result may be 
unduly harsh, especially where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in 
light of the remedial nature of anti-discrimination legislation. Some 
courts have responded by equitably tolling the limitations period. 
Tolling is the method used by the courts to artificially stop the running 
of time as it applies to a statute of limitations. 168 Hence, tolling the 
limitations period allows the plaintiff to meet the fourth requirement 
of the Schiavone test, that the correct defendant receive notice of the 
action within the limitations period. 169 Principles of equity are used to 
toll a statute of limitations period when notions of fairness and justice 
so require. 170 The question as to whether a limitations period will be 
tolled generally arises when a defendant has not received proper notice 
of the action before the expiration of the statute of limitations. 
The Supreme Court has suggested that courts may toll a Title VII 
limitations period where: 
[A] claimant has received inadequate notice ... where a motion for 
appointment of counsel is pending and equity would justify tolling 
the statutory period until the motion is acted upon ... , where the 
court has led the plaintiff to believe that she had done everything 
required of her ... [or] where affirmative misconduct on the part of 
a defendant lulled the plaintiff into inaction. 171 
processes than a plaintiff who is not. See infra notes 265-73 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the reliance issue. 
168. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (6th ed. 1990). One commentator has sug­
gested that courts may be willing to toll statutes of limitation because these time periods are 
arbitrarily drawn by the legislature. Fischer, The Limits ofStatutes ofLimitation, 16 Sw. 
U.L. REv. I, 3 (1986). 
169. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 29; see supra text accompanying notes 58-74. 
170. See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984) (per 
curiam); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982); Warren v. Department of 
Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1989); Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988); Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987); Harris v. Wal­
green's Distribution Center, 456 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1972); Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153 
(6th Cir. 1956). 
171. Baldwin County, 466 U.S. at 151 (citing Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RE 
3-1, 652 F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1981); Villasenor v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 640 F.2d 207 
(9th Cir. 1981); Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 621 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1980); 
Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1979); Gates v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp., 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974); Harris v. Walgreen's Distribution Center, 456 F.2d 
588 (6th Cir. 1972» (The Court discussed these general notions of tolling in dicta.). Several 
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In Burnett v. New York Central Railroad CO.,I72 the Supreme 
Court indicated that in order to determine whether a limitations pe­
riod may be tolled, a court must first look to the "legislative intent [as 
to] whether the right shall be enforceable . . . after the prescribed 
time."173 Determination of the congressional intent requires an exam­
ination of "the purposes and policies underlying the limitation provi­
sion, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme developed for the 
enforcement of the rights given by the Act."174 
The general purpose of a statute of limitations is to "assure fair­
ness to defendants."17s A limitations period is: 
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the re­
vival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has 
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. 
The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put 
the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation 
and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail 
over the right to prosecute them. 176 
Several courts have ruled that this "policy of repose"177 is outweighed 
where equitable considerations and the "interests of justice require 
vindication of the plaintiff's rights!'178 However, as noted by one 
court, "[t]he tolling exception is not an open-ended invitation to the 
courts to disregard limitations periods simply because they bar what 
may be an otherwise meritorious cause. [Courts] may not ignore the 
legislative intent to grant the defendant a period of repose after the 
courts have relied on the Supreme Court's language in Baldwin to toll a limitations period. 
See Warren, 867 F.2d 1156; Mondy, 845 F.2d 1051; Paulk, 830 F.2d 79; Martinez v. Orr, 
738 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1984). 
172. 380 U.S. 424 (1965). 
173. Id. at 426 (quoting Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 U.S. 
356,360 (1943». Burnett involved tolling of the limitations period under the Federal Em­
ployer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958). Id. at 424. The Court referred to 
the congressional purpose in enacting FELA as "humane and remedial." Id. at 427. 
174. Id. at 427. 
175. Id. at 428. 
176. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (quoting Order 
ofR.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342,348-49 (1944»; see also 6A 
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 18, § 1502, at 164-65 ("[T)he purpose of 
requiring actions seeking judicial relief to be filed within a prescribed statutory period and 
in a certain manner [i]s to insure that an appropriate official or agency of the government 
receive[s] timely notice of the claim."). 
177. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428. 
178. Id. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 482 (1980); American Pipe, 
414 U.S. at 554; Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 
U.S. 1031 (1981). 
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limitations period has expired."179 With regard to Title VII time lim­
its, the judiciary has been hesitant to equitably modify the legislative 
pronouncement except in the most narrow of factual circumstances. 180 
Although not central to the issue of whether the period for service 
of a complaint may be tolled to accord proper notice under Rule 15(c), 
another critical question in many tolling cases is the determination of 
when the action actually began. 181 The Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure provide that an action "is commenced by filing a complaint with 
the court." 182 In several cases which discuss the application of equita­
ble tolling, the plaintiff had failed to file the action prior to the expira­
tion of a limitations period. 183 Factors used by courts to consider the 
application of tolling in these cases include: whether or not the plain­
tiff was represented by counsel;l84 whether the plaintiff had been in 
some way "prevented" from asserting her rights;18S whether the de­
fendant has "actively misled the plaintiff respecting the cause of ac­
tion"; 186 whether a court or a state or federal agency has "lulled" the 
plaintiff into inaction; 187 whether the plaintiff has acted diligently; 188 
and whether the plaintiff's conduct demonstrated an intention to pro­
179. School Dist. v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Mondy v. 
Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (courts' power to exercise equita­
ble tolling should be used "only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances"); 
Smith v. American President Lines, 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978) (tolling of Title VII 
time limits "may be very restricted"). 
180. See Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 458 (1990) ("Federal courts have 
typically extended equitable relief only sparingly."); Rys v. United States Postal Serv., 886 
F.2d 443, 446 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Mack v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 
185 (1st Cir. 1989» (equitable exceptions to Title VII limitations periods are to be viewed 
narrowly); Kocian v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1983) (equitable 
tolling of Title VII time limits allowed only in "extraordinary circumstances"), cert. de­
nied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); Smith, 571 F.2d at III (case must present "unusual circum­
stances" to invoke tolling). 
181. Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153, 155 (6th Cir. 1956). 
182. FED. R. av. P. 3. 
183. See International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Loca1 790 v. Rob­
bins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 237-40 (1976) (no tolling where plaintiff filed grievance 
through collective bargaining agreement rather than timely filing of a civil case); Kocian v. 
Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir.) (no tolling where plaintiff "never filed 
a timely claim in any forum"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); Smith, 571 F.ld at 105, 
109 (no tolling where claim was not timely filed). 
184. Irwin, 111 S. Ct. at 458. 
185. Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. at 237 n.1O (1976) (quoting Burnett v. New York 
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 429 (1965». 
186. Smith, 571 F.2d at 109. 
187. Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RE 3-1,652 F.2d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 1981). 
188. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) ("One 
who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of 
diligence. "). 
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ceed with the action. 189 
B. 	 The General Inquiries-Is'Equitable Tolling Consistent With the 
Applicable Statutes and Rules? 
1. 	 Title VII 
A review of several cases in the general area of equitable tolling 
suggests a multi-step analysis to determine the compatibility of the 
statute in question with the application of tolling. 190 
The first step in the tolling analysis requires an examination of 
the statute and its legislative history to determine the legislative intent 
specifically with regard to tolling. The court must decide "whether 
... in a given context [tolling] is consonant with the legislative 
scheme,"191 or whether the "congressional purpose is effectuated by 
tolling the statute of limitations in given circumstances."192 
In Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 193 a case involving securities law 
violations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
outlined the steps to be taken in determining whether tolling is "con­
sonant with the legislative scheme."194 The first step proposed by the 
court in Whittaker is to look at the "bare words of the time provi­
sion."19S If the statute is silent with regard to tolling, the court must 
then examine the legislative history.196 If the legislative history is si­
lent, then the court should consider the congressional intent of the 
statute as a whole considering "the place of the time provision in that 
overall legislative scheme."197 
Applying this analysis to Title VII, the "bare words"198 of Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), lend little insight into the purpose of the 
thirty-day limitations period. The 1972 limitations provision merely 
instructs the plaintiff to file a civil action within thirty days of receipt 
of the right-to-sue letter. 199 It does not indicate why a limitations pe­
189. 	 Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153, 155 (6th Cir. 1956). 
190. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 556-59 (1974); Whitta­
ker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). 
191. 	 American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 558. 
192. 	 Burnett V. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965). 
193. 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981) (construction of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(P), insider short-swing trading 
provisions). 
194. 	 American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 558. 
195. Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 527. 
196. 	 ·Id. at 528. 
197. 	 Id. 
198. 	 Id. at 527. 
199. 	 See supra note 22 for the text of this statutory time limit. 
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riod is required or why a thirty-day period was chosen.200 The statute 
is also silent regarding the specific issue of tolling.201 
Similarly, at the second step of the analysis, the legislative history 
of the original Title VII limitations period regarding private party de­
fendants is not helpful in discerning the intent of Congress. The legis­
lative rationale behind the original limitations period of Title VII is 
"sparse" but its purpose was described "as preventing the pressing of 
'stale' c1aims."202 Presumably, the purpose of the limitations period 
was similar to that of most statutes of limitations, to afford a period of 
repose to potential defendants.203 
The statute and its legislative history do not provide sufficient 
guidance regarding the potential application of equitable tolling. 
Therefore, the analysis falls to the third step outlined in Whittaker.204 
Like the limitations period in Whittaker, the Title VII time limit for 
suit by individuals against the federal government is "made a part of 
the section itself rather than incorporated by reference to another pro­
vision."20s Accordingly, the provision must be construed as part of 
the overa11 legislative scheme.206 
In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,207 the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the legislative scheme of Title VII and the application 
of waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling to Title VII suits against pri­
vate sector defendants. The Court found that timely filing of such Ti­
200. See SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE CoMM. ON LABOR ANO PUBLIC 
WELFARE, 920 CoNG., 20 SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY Acr OF 1972 (H.R. 1746, P.L. 92-261) AMENDING TITLE VII OF THE 
CIvIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter SUBCOMM. ON LABOR]. 
201. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988). 
202. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (citing statement of 
Sen. Case, 110 CoNG. REc. 7243 (1964». 
203. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. 
204. Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 528. 
205. Id. In Whittaker, the time limit was provided by the insider trading provisions 
ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, IS U.S.C. § 78 (1971). Id. at 518-19. In Title VII, 
the thirty-day limitations provision is part of the overall statutory section encompassing 
employment by the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1988). 
206. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 (1974); Burnett v. 
New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,426 (1965) (citing Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Penn­
sylvania R.R., 320 U.S. 356, 360 (1943»; Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 527-28. 
As suggested by the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe, a court must also 
answer the question of whether the judiciary has the power to toll statutes of limitation and 
to apply its interpretation of a particular legislative scheme. 414 U.S. at 558; see also Zipes 
v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982); Burnett, 380 U.S. at 426-27. In Ameri­
can Pipe, the Supreme Court answered this question affirmatively, and employed tolling 
regardless of whether the time limitations are procedural or substantive. 414 U.S. at 558­
59. 
207. 455 U.S. 385 (1982). 
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tle VII claims was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, but rather, 
like a statute of limitations, it was subject to principles of equity.20S 
Exercising its discretion, the Court specifically relied on "[t]he struc­
ture of Title VII [and] the congressional policy underlying it."209 
Based upon the language in the time provision which was silent as to 
the jurisdiction of the courts, the Court found that the time for filing 
suit was in the nature of a statute of limitations, rather than a jurisdic­
tional prerequisite.210 
In Zipes, the Court also restated its position regarding the "guid­
ing principle for construing the provisions of Title VII."211 Citing an 
earlier Title VII case, the Court noted that "a technical reading [of the 
statute] would be 'particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in 
which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.' "212 
The Supreme Court further stated that holding the time limits of 
Title VII subject to tolling "when equity so requires ... honor[s] the 
remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the 
particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to 
the employer."213 Other courts have also noted the "remedial and hu­
manitarian underpinnings of Title VII."214 
In Irwin v. Veterans Administration,21s the Supreme Court ex­
tended the Zipes rationale to Title VII suits against the federal govern­
ment.216 In Irwin, the plaintiff alleged that he had been unlawfully 
discharged from his position with the Veteran's Administration be­
cause of his race and physical disability.217 The EEOC dismissed Ir­
win's complaint and mailed a right-to-sue letter to both the plaintiff 
and his attorney. The attorney's office received the letter on March 
23, while the attorney was out of the country.21S "The attorney did 
not learn ofthe EEOC's action until his return on April 10."219 Plain­
208. Id. at 393. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 394. The applicable statutory section designating the time limits for Title 
VII suit against a private party defendant is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988). The statute of 
limitations section for suit against a federal government defendant specifically incorporates 
the section for suing private defendants. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988). 
211. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 397. 
212. Id. (citing Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972». 
213. Id. at 398. 
214. Harris v. Walgreen's Distribution Center, 456 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1970». 
215. 111 S. O. 453 (1990). 
216. Id. at 457. 
217. Id. at 455. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
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tiff Irwin's Title VII complaint was filed on May 6.220 The Supreme 
Court upheld the court of appeals and found that the complaint was 
untimely as it had been filed forty-four days after the attorney's office 
received the right-to-sue letter.221 
In an effort to save the complaint, the plaintiff argued that the 
doctrine of equitable tolling could be applied in Title VII suits against 
the federal government, and that the limitations period should be 
tolled in this case.222 The Court accepted the plaintiff's contention 
that equitable tolling applied to suits against the federal government, 
thereby extending the Zipes rationale to these cases.223 The Court 
found that since Congress had waived the sovereign immunity of the 
United States by allowing a civil action under Title VII, permitting the 
application of tolling did "little, if any, [to] broad[en] ... the congres­
sional waiver. "224 The Court held "that the same rebuttable presump­
tion of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the private 
defendants ... also appl[ies] to suits against the United States."22S 
The Court then refused to toll the limitations period on behalf of the 
plaintiff, finding that the evidence did not reveal cause for application 
of tolling.226 
2. The. In Forma Pauperis Statute 
In the factual scenario of a Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff 
suing the federal government, the analysis cannot be limited to Title 
VII but must also consider the federal in forma pauperis statute.227 
The overall legislative purpose of the in forma pauperis statute should 
be read in connection With Title VII when considering the application 
of equitable tolling in step three of the Whittaker analysis, examina­
tion of the congressional intent in enacting the statute as a whole. 228 
The legislative purpose for enactment of the in forma pauperis 
220. Id. 
221. id. at 456. The Court found that receipt by the office was equivalent to receipt 
by the attorney and that "[u]nder our system ·of representative litigation, 'each party is 
deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have 'notice of all facts, 
notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.' '" Id. (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 
370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1880»). 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 457. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 458. The Court found that the plaintiff's failure to file in a timely manner 
as a result of his attorney's absence was at most "excusable neglect" and not an instance 
which warranted tolling. Id. 
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). 
228. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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statute is similar to the remedial goals of Title VII. "Congress enacted 
the in forma pauperis statute to 'open the United States courts to a 
class of citizens who have rights to be adjudicated,' but who are too 
poor to pay the filing fees and court costs. "229 The statute ensures 
equal access to the federal courts and the opportunity for all individu­
als to litigate the merits of their legitimate claims without regard to 
wealth.230 
3. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
The final question in considering whether tolling is appropriate in 
the case of the Title VII, pro se, in forma pauperis plaintiff who mis­
names the defendant involves the applicable Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Unfortunately, the Rules provide little guidance regarding 
the tolling issue as they may be read both to favor and disfavor the 
equitable tolling exception to the statute of limitations. 
The "barewords"231 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may 
be interpreted to allow equitable tolling and the adjudication of the 
merits of a claim or to disfavor tolling and prohibit the plaintiff from 
continuing. Rule 1, which applies to construction of the rest of the 
Rules, notes that the Rules should be applied so as to "secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."232 Rule 8(f) 
states that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial 
justice."233 On one hand, the justice requirements of the Rules favor 
tolling because tolling affords the plaintiff the chance to adjudicate his 
or her claim. On the other hand, "justice" may be read through the 
eyes of the defendant to disfavor tolling. The necessity for "speedy 
and inexpensive" resolution of cases would also preclude tolling as it 
necessarily delays a proceeding beyond the specified statute of limita­
tions. The literal language of Rule IS(c) does not appear to provide 
any insight as to whether tolling should be allowed to permit relation 
229. Note, supra note 32, at 746 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 1097, 52d Cong. 1st Sess. 1 
(1892». 
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). The "statute is intended to guarantee that no 
citizen shall be denied an opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend an action, civil or 
criminal, 'in any court of the United States' solely because his poverty makes it impossible 
for him to payor secure the costs." Adkins v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 
331, 342 (1948) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 832(1), which was the original codification of 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(a». 
231. Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 1031 (1981). 
232. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
233. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f). 
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back.234 The Rule does not mention any remedial purpose for equity 
nor does it state any language which could be read to permit tolling. 
It does state that in order to allow relation back, the defendant should 
have received such notice so as not to be prejudiced.235 This require­
ment is basic to any decision to allow tolling.236 
In addition to the actual language of the Rules, the Advisory 
Committee's Notes accompanying the amendments to the Rules pro­
vide guidance as to the intent behind their enactment.237 Similar to 
Title VII and the in forma pauperis statute, the Advisory Committee's 
Notes to the 1966 amendments to Rule IS(c) reflect a remedial con­
cern in that they emphasize, similar to the Title VII decisions dis­
cussed above, that Rule IS(c)'s purpose was to guarantee a hearing on 
the merits of a case rather than to impose a strict technical approach 
to pleadings.238 This is especially true where the defendant is a federal 
government agency head and, due to the complexity of the federal 
government, his or her name is difficult to ascertain.239 This is pre­
cisely the situation addressed by the Advisory Committee's Notes to 
the amendment.24O 
In defining the limits of Rule IS(c), the United States Supreme 
Court has not ruled against the use of tolling to allow relation back. 
In Schiavone, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the district 
court had "ruled that the 'equities of this situation' did not demand 
that relief be afforded to petitioners."241 
A brief review of how Schiavone is distinguished from the case of 
the Title VII, pro se, in forma pauperis plaintiff illustrates the limita­
tions of the Court's decision and why it does not preclude equitable 
tolling. In Schiavone, the plaintiff was represented by counsel, and 
was not reliant upon the court to effect service.242 The limitations pe­
riod in Schiavone was one year.243 This Contrasts sharply with the 
234. For the text of Rule 15(c), see supra note 48. 
235. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c). 
236. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per 
curiam). 
237. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) ("Although the Advisory Com­
mittee's comments do not foreclose judicial consideration of the Rule's validity, and mean­
ing, the construction given by the Committee is 'of weight.' .. (citing Mississippi Publishing 
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946))). 
238. 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 18, § 1502, at 165 n.l0. 
239. Id. 
240. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note; see supra text accompanying 
notes 50-57. 
241. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 24-25 (citing Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. at 24a). 
242. Id. at 23. 
243. Id. 
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relatively short thirty-day limitations period of Title VII. In Schia­
vone, there was no administrative proceeding prior to the filing of the 
lawsuit which might have misled the plaintiff into a belief that Fortune 
was the proper defendant. 244 These differences between Schiavone and 
cases similar to Johnson, Soto, Mondy, Paulk, and Warren, and the 
Court's specific notation in Schiavone that equity could not aid the 
plaintiffs, suggests that the Court might not disallow tolling in the Ti­
tle VII cases. 
c. 	 The Specific Inquiries-Is Equitable Tolling Consistent With the 
Facts? 
Ifapplication of the doctrine of equitable tolling is consistent with 
the applicable statutes and rules, the next logical step in the analysis is 
to examine the specific factual circumstances of the pending case to 
determine if tolling is appropriate.24S This determination should be 
based on three areas of inquiry: the presence or absence of any active 
deception or misrepresentation suffered by the plaintiff; the plaintiff's 
reliance on the court, its officers or communications from an in­
vestigative agency;246 and the plaintiff's diligence or lack of diligence 
in pursuit of the claim.247 These different inquiries are inextricably 
related. For example, a plaintiff's reliance may be the result of 
misrepresentation,248 or a plaintiff's diligence may lead to his or her 
reliance.249 This Section will present a basic explanation of these fac­
tual inquiries and show how they are related by analyzing the 
facts m the Johnson,2so Soto,2S1 Mondy,2S2 Paulk,2s3 and 
244. 	 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
245. See Baldwin Coll!lty Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984) (per 
curiam); Rys v. United States Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443 (1st Cir. 1989); Johnson v. United 
States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989); 
Mondy V. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Paulk V. Department of Air 
Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987); GonZalez-Aller Balseyro V. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 
F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1983); Harris v. Walgreen's Distribution Center, 456 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 
1972); Mohler V. Miller, 235 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1956). 
246. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is an example of such an 
agency. See supra note 21. 
247. 	 Irwin v. Veterans Admin., III S. Ct. 453 (1990). 
248. See Rys V. United States Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443, 446 (1st Cir. 1989) (plaintiff 
alleged that he relied upon a misleading right-to-sue letter). 
249. See Johnson V. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1486-87 (10th Cir. 
1988) (McKay, J., dissenting) (plaintiff alleged to have complied with time requirements of 
statute and therefore, was entitled to rely upon the court to effect service), cert. denied, 110 
S. Ct. 54 (1989). 
250. 	 /d. 
251. Soto V. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
III S. Ct. 679 (1991). 
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Wa"en 2S4 decisions. 
1. Active Deception or Misrepresentation 
The fact-based tolling analysis typical1y begins with the question 
of whether the plaintiff was somehow misled into naming the wrong 
defendant or into filing after the expiration of the limitations period.2ss 
. If the plaintiff was misled or the court, its officers, a federal agency or 
the defendant somehow actively deceived the plaintiff into his or her 
mistake, then tolling of the limitations period will often be allowed in 
order to correct the error.2S6 Active deception also includes those 
cases where the plaintiff was "lulled into inaction" or was. "in some 
extraordinary way [] prevented from asserting his or her rights. "2S7 
Examples of active deception in the area of Title VII include those 
cases where the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC confused the plain­
tiff as to who should be named as the defendant2S8 or where the dis­
trict court informed the plaintiff that filing of the right-to-sue letter 
would toll the limitations period until the plaintiff had obtained coun­
sel.2S9 Hence, active deception includes both those cases where a party 
may have purposefully misled a plaintiff, and those cases where the 
deception was unintentional. The underlying rationale for al10wing 
tolling in these cases is that refusal to allow the plaintiff an opportu­
nity to adjudicate his or her claim would be unfair. 
In Johnson, the majority argued that the statute of limitations pe­
riod could only be tolled based on active deception where the evidence 
revealed some "false representation by [a] court, agency, or putative 
defendant."260 Similarly, in Solo, the court stated that there must be 
an "affirmative showing" of inequity to al10w tolling.261 
252. Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
253. Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th CiT. 1987). 
254. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156 (8th CiT. 1989). 
255. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984) (per curiam); 
Rys v. United States Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443 (1st CiT. 1989); Johnson v. United States 
Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989); Martinez v. 
Orr, 738 F.2d 1107 (10th CiT. 1984); Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 
F.2d 857 (10th CiT. 1983). 
256. See cases cited supra note 255. 
257. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1481 (quoting Martinez, 738 F.2d at 1110 (quoting Carlile 
v. South Routt School Dist. RE 3-J, 652 F.2d 981, 986 (10th CiT. 1981); Wilkerson v. 
Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 348 (10th Cir. 1982»). 
258. Rys, 886 F.2d at 446-47; Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1160 
(8th Cir. 1989); Martinez, 738 F.2d at 1110-11. 
259. Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro, 702 F.2d at 859. 
260. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1481. 
261. Soto v. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537, 541 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing 
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In contrast, the Johnson dissent argued that a plaintiff who had 
filed a complaint almost immediately after receiving the right-to-sue 
letter "could be completely out of court even though the Marshal pro­
ceeded within the [120-day] time limit permitted by [Rule] 4(j)."262 
The dissent further argued that this outcome was the equivalent of an 
active deception because the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to 
litigate his or her claim.263 The conclusion by the Johnson dissent that 
the 120-day time limit allowed for service works a deception on the 
plaintiff was linked to the issue of reliance. The plaintiff was forced to 
rely on the procedures set out by statute. Accordingly, reliance is the 
next issue to be addressed. 
2. Reliance 
The issue of reliance is particularly important in the case of a pro 
se, in forma pauperis plaintiff because of the individual's lack of legal 
expertise in dealing with the complicated procedural maze of Title VII 
and the in forma pauperis statute. The reliance issue relates to active 
deception because a misrepresentation by a court may lead to reliance 
by a plaintiff. For example, a plaintiff may delay service based upon 
the statement of a court that filing a right-to-sue letter tolls the statute 
of limitations.264 
An individual attempting to proceed in forma pauperis is also 
forced into a position of reliance upon the court. Once the individual 
has filed the motion he or she is dependent upon the court to consider 
the motion within the statute of limitations and, if the motion is 
granted, to effect timely service upon the defendant.26s The Warren, 
Mondy, and Paulk courts all permitted equitable tolling of the statute 
of limitations precisely because the plaintiffs were forced to rely upon 
the court and its processes.266 In Mondy, the court allowed tolling 
because the in forma pauperis plaintiff "lawfully relied upon the mar­
shal's office to effect service."267 In Warren and Paulk, tolling was 
Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1984) (per curiam», 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 679 (1991). 
262. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1486 n.lO (McKay, J., dissenting). 
263. Id. 
264. Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 
1983); see also Rys v. United States Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443, 447 (1st Cir. 1989) (plaintiff 
alleged he relied upon and was misled by right-to-sue letter. Court rejected this argument 
noting that plaintiff's actions "belie[d] his alleged reliance" on the letter). 
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). See supra note 32 for the text of the statut~. 
266. For a discussion of the facts in these cases, see supra notes 135-66 and accompa­
nying text. 
267. Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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allowed for the time period in which each court considered the motion 
to proceed in forma pauperis because this time period essentially 
shortened the already short Title VII limitations period. 268 
The decisions in Wa"en, Mondy, and Paulk all parallel the dis­
sent in Johnson, which was also based primarily upon the plaintiff's 
reliance on the court and its processes. The dissent argued that the 
plaintiff was "lulled into inaction" (or actively deceived)269 by the 
court order granting the in forma pauperis motion which allowed him 
to rely on the court and its officers (the Marshal's service) to effect 
proper service.270 The dissent emphasized that the process itself could 
lead a party to rely and that reliance need not only be fostered by an 
explicit statement or deception.271 The dissent also noted that the ex­
plicit language of the in forma pauperis statute requires that" '[t]he 
officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all 
duties' in this type of case."272 This led the dissent to conclude that 
officers of the court owe a "special duty" to "unsophisticated 
plaintiffs."273 
3. Diligence 
Plaintiffs who wish to persuade a court to invoke equitable tolling 
sufficient to allow relation back of an amended complaint must act 
with diligence in pursuing their claims or face certain dismissal. 274 
Therefore, courts will look at a plaintiff's conduct in pursuit of an 
action when considering the application of tolling.275 Although plain­
268. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 1989); Paulk v. 
Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Harris v. Walgreen's 
Distribution Center, 456 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1972) (limitations period tolled during pen­
dency of motion for appointment of counsel). . 
Although the Mondy court indicated that the plaintiff's reliance was upon the Mar­
shal, the facts revealed that some of the delay was based upon the district court's sua sponte 
dismissal of the initial motion. Mondy, 845 F.2d at 1053 n;2. 
269. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text. 
270. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1486-87 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(McKay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). 
271. Id. at 1487. 
272. Id. at 1486 (citing 29 [sic] U.S.C. § 1915(c». 
273. Id. 
274. Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453, 458 (1990); Baldwin County Wel­
come Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per curiam); Rys v. United States Postal 
Serv., 886 F.2d 443, 448 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 25 
(1986) (citing Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a) (The Court discussed the district court's 
ruling that equity should not be used to allow relation back noting that the "petitioners 
created [their own] risk by filing their suits close to the end of the limitations period."). 
275. Rys, 886 F.2d at 447 (plaintiff did not act with sufficient diligence; no tolling); 
Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff did not 
"needlessly delay[]"; tolling allowed); Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 
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tiffs may not proceed with technical accuracy, courts may consider 
certain actions sufficiently diligent to permit tolling. The diligence re­
quirement may be satisfied when a plaintiff has attempted timely pur­
suit of his or her action, for example, by filing a complaint,276 a right­
to-sue letter,277 or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis278 within the 
limitations period. 
In the Warren, Mondy, and Paulk cases, all of the plaintiffs were 
deemed to have been diligent in pursuit of their claims. The dissent in 
Johnson argued that there was "no evidence on the record to suggest 
undue delay on Mr. Johnson's part."279 The majority disagreed.28o 
While the majority did not refer specifically to the notion of diligence, 
it did state that Johnson's complaint was "inadequate," and that the 
Marshal was not at fault for delaying service into the 120-day period 
allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 40).281 Similarly, in Soto, 
the court found that the major flaw in the plaintiff's case for equitable 
tolling was his failure to file the action and the motion to proceed in 
forma pauperis until the final day of the limitations period.282 
IV. EQUITABLE TOLLING AS A SOLUTION 
Equitable tolling appears to be the only current option available 
to Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiffs who attempt to amend their 
pleadings to correct a misnomer in the name of the defendant after the 
expiration of the thirty-day statute of limitations period. This Section 
discusses the limitations of equitable tolling, arguing that it is not the 
best solution to the problem of the misnamed Title VII defendant. 
The Section then proposes solutions which would lessen the need for 
equitable tolling in these cases. 
A. A Critique ofEquitable Tolling 
The variations presented by Johnson, Soto, Mondy, Paulk, and 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (plaintiff did not expect "same day service"; tolling allowed (quoting Con­
forte v. Commissioner, 459 U.S. 1309, 1311 (1983»); Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Len­
kurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff did not sleep on his rights; tolling 
allowed). 
276. Mondy, 845 F.2d at 1057. 
277. Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro, 702 F.2d at 859. 
278. Warren, 867 F.2d at 1160. 
279. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1476 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(McKay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). 
280. Id. at 1480. 
281. Id. 
282. Soto V. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537, 541 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. de­
nied, 111 S. Ct. 679 (1991). 
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Wa"en may be viewed as a continuum of factual situations presented 
by the Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff restricted by Rule lS(c). 
At one extreme is the Soto plaintiff who failed to take any action either 
by filing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis or by filing a com­
plaint.283 In Soto, the court was justified in denying the application of 
equitable tolling based on any analysis. The Soto plaintiff did not al­
low any window in which the court could consider his in forma 
pauperis motion. Therefore, he could not be said to have relied on the 
court to allow enough time for service of the complaint. The plaintiff 
could not have realistically expected a decision on his motion the day 
it was filed. Accordingly, he could not argue that the court should 
equitably toll the limitations period based on his reliance that the 
court would effect timely and appropriate service under the in forma 
pauperis statute. 
Wa"en, Mondy, and Paulk present the other end of the spec­
trum. In Wa"en and Mondy, timely complaints were filed with at 
least five days left within the limitations period for the Marshal to 
effect service.284 In Paulk, the court did not note the specific date of 
filing, relying on the decision of the district court to assume timeli­
ness.28 !1 In each case, delay caused by the courts or ambiguity in the 
right-ta-sue letter made the decision to toll the limitations period rela­
tively easy. None of these cases presented the problem of plaintiff dili­
gence in light of the short statute of limitations. 
Johnson is the factually difficult case which falls somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum. In Johnson, the plaintiff filed his motion to 
proceed in forma pauperis five days after receipt of the right-ta-sue 
letter.286 The court did not delay in granting the motion, ruling on it 
four days later.287 The problem arose when the plaintiff waited an­
other two weeks before filing a pro se complaint on the final day of the 
limitations period.288 Like the plaintiff in Soto, plaintiff Johnson could 
not have expected timely service. The crux of the dispute between the 
283. Id. at 539. For a discussion of the facts in Soto, see supra notes 117-31 and 
accompanying text. 
284. Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Mondy v. Secretary of Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1988). For a discussion of 
these cases, see supra notes 159-66 & 135-45 and accompanying text. 
285. Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 80 n.l (7th Cir. 1987). See 
supra notes 146-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Paulk. 
286. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1476 (10th Cir. 1988), 
eert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). See supra notes 80-116 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Johnson. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. 
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Johnson majority and the Johnson dissent was whether the plaintiff 
had a right to rely on the court to effect timely and proper service 
because he had been given the right to proceed in forma pauperis. As 
noted by the Johnson dissent, the in forma pauperis statute provides 
that the court will effect all service.289 In fact, the plaintiff proceeding 
in forma pauperis has no option but to allow the court to serve the 
complaint.290 The Johnson case presents a conflict between the reli­
ance291 and diligence factors of the tolling analysis. 
While the bare facts of a case and the plaintiff's actions are gener­
ally dispositive of the tolling question, the outcome of a case like John­
son is dependent upon the weight given the factors of diligence and 
reliance in applying the analysis. The Johnson majority clearly gave 
more weight to diligence, whereas, the Johnson dissent found the reli­
ance factor more persuasive. As tolling is an equitable measure, it is 
somewhat unpredictable which factor will be given more weight by a 
particular court.292 This lack of predictability adds another potential 
barrier which may keep the plaintiff from litigating the merits of his or 
her claim. 
The various steps in the tolling analysis also add the burden of 
additional procedure on a legally unsophisticated plaintiff. The path 
to court on the merits of a case for a Title VII, in forma pauperis 
plaintiff is fraught with technicalities and specific pleading require­
ments. The plaintiff must first pursue administrative remedies through 
an agency such as the EEOC.293 Within one month after receiving a 
right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff must file a motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis and a complaint specifically naming the head of the agency or 
department as defendant.294 If a plaintiff fails to name and serve the 
proper defendant, the technical requirements for relation back under 
Rule 15(c) must be met. If these requirements cannot be completed 
because of the lack of timely service to the proper defendant, or other 
appropriate parties such as the United States Attorney General, the 
plaintiff must then meet the tests of the equitable tolling analysis. Re­
. liance on equitable tolling as a method to escape 15(c) can end up as 
289. ld. at 1486 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
290. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). For the text of this statute, see supra note 32. 
291. For the purposes of this discussion, reliance includes misrepresentation as ar­
gued by the dissent in Johnson. See supra text accompanying notes 106-16. 
292. For recommendations regarding the balance between reliance and diligence, see 
infra notes 308-16 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra note 21. 
294. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I6(c) (1988). 
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an extension of the quagmire of pleading technicalities. The process 
may seem hopelessly difficult, especially to a pro se plaintiff. 
B. Proposals for Change 
1. Revise Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) 
Courts would not be asked to equitably toll the Title VII limita­
tions period if Rule 15(c) were amended. Professor Robert Brussack 
proposed amending Rule 15(c) to allow relation back if the defendant 
received proper notice of the complaint during the period allowed for 
"service of the original pleading. "295 The amendment would give the 
plaintiff an extra 120 days for service as provided by Rule 4(j), thereby 
eliminating the current conflict between the necessity for notice within 
a short limitations period, like that of Title VII, and the extended 120­
day period for service.296 In accordance with the second sentence of 
Rule 15(c), timely service by the United States Marshal on the Attor­
ney General or the United States Attorney would therefore be suffi­
cient to allow relation back in these Title VII cases.297 If Rule 15(c) 
were amended as Brussack suggested, the plaintiffs in Johnson and 
Soto would have had their day in court and the doctrine of equitable 
tolling would not have been at issue. 
The premise for Professor Brussack's proposal relies upon the 
1966 amendments to Rule 15(c) and the Advisory Committee's reli­
ance on cases in which Social Security claimants had mistakenly 
named the wrong defendants.298 Brussack suggested that his proposed 
amendment would allow relation back in cases like the Social Security 
cases, thereby effectuating the intent of the 1966 Advisory Commit­
tee.299 On a more basic level, Brussack's amendment "would consti­
tute a reaffirmation of the principle that pleading mistakes generally 
should not be fatal to lawsuits."3°O 
Amending Rule 15( c), as Brussack suggested, would eliminate 
the need for tolling in Title VII cases where the United States Marshal 
properly serves the complaint on behalf of an in forma pauperis plain­
295. Brussack, supra note 56, at 687. Other commentators have also suggested 
amending Rule 15(c) to achieve the same result. See Epter, supra note 56; Note, Threshold 
Requirement, supra note 56; Note, Looking Forward, supra note 56. 
296. Brussack, supra note 56, at 688. See supra note 100 for the text of Rule 4(j). 
297. Brussack, supra note 56, at 688. See supra note 48 for the text of Rule 15(c). 
298. Brussack, supra note 56. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the 1966 amendments and the Advisory Committee's reliance on the Social 
Security cases. 
299. Brussack, supra note 56, at 688. 
300. Id. 
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tiff within the 12O-day period allowed by Rule 4(j). For example, if 
the Johnson complaint had been served upon the United States Attor­
ney and/or the Attorney General within 120 days, the appropriate 
party would have had proper notice within the period allowed for 
"service of the original pleading."301 In cases like Johnson and Soto, 
where the United States Attorney was not served until after the 120­
day period,302 Rule 4(j) would not necessarily require dismissal of the 
complaints as the Rule allows a party to "show good cause why such 
service was not made within [the] period."303 Hence, the amendment 
might also resolve cases like Johnson and Soto. 
2. Extend the Limitations Period of Title VII 
Even if Rule IS(c) is amended, Congress should amend Title VII 
to extend the thirty-day limitations period for civil action to ninety 
days, similar to the time allowed for Title VII plaintiffs suing private 
party defendants.304 The 1972 enactment of a right-to-sue on behalf of 
federal employees was intended to give federal employees status equal 
to their private sector counterparts in seeking redress from employ­
ment discrimination. The legislative history of Title VII reflects this 
intention. In support of the legislation, Senator Williams stated: 
(W]ritten expressly into the law is a provision enabling an aggrieved 
Federal employee to file an action in U.S. District Court for a re­
view of the administrative proceeding record after a final order by 
his agency or by the Civil Service Commission, if he is dissatisfied 
with that decision. Previously, there have been unrealistically high 
barriers which prevented or discouraged a Federal employe [sic] 
from taking a case to court. This will no longer be the case. There 
is no reason why a Federal employee should not have the same private 
right ofaction enjoyed by individuals in the private sector, and I be­
lieve that the committee has acted wisely in this regard. 
Mr. President, I appreciate the Senate's time and attention. I 
am convinced that the language in the committee bill regarding 
Federal employees will prove a substantial help to those, who, for so 
long, have been "second class citizens, " as far as equal employment 
opportunity is concerned.305 
301. [d. at 687. 
302. Soto v. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 537, 539 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. de­
nied, 111 S. Ct. 679 (1991); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1476 
(10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). 
303. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j). For the full text of Rule 4(j), see supra note 100. 
304. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988). 
305. 118 CoNG. REC. 4922 (1972), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, supra note 
200, at 1727 (emphasis added). 
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Extending the limitations period from thirty to ninety days would 
accordingly allow a more reasonable amount of time for the plaintiff to 
file his or her in forma pauperis motion and complaint. An extension 
of the limitatioris period would also afford true equality to federal em­
ployees, as Congress originally intended. 306 
The extended time is especially important in light of the inexperi­
ence of most pro se plaintiffs who file in forma pauperis motions. The 
thirty-day limitations period of Title VII barely leaves a plaintiff suffi­
cient time to file the in forma pauperis motion and original complaint. 
It leaves no buffer for pleading errors such as naming incorrect Title 
VII defendants. Extension of the limitations period to ninety days 
would provide plaintiffs, like Johnson, who diligently pursue their 
claim shortly after receipt of the right-to-sue letter, more time for cor­
rection of errors. Extending the limitations period would, therefore, 
reduce the number of in forma pauperis plaintiffs seeking equitable 
tolling in an effort to correct a misnamed defendant. . 
In the cases which still necessitate application of Rule 15(c), ad­
ding sixty days to the Title VII limitations period would reduce the 
tension between diligence and reliance in the equitable tolling analysis. 
Favoring or weighting diligence over reliance where the statute pro-· 
vided a ninety-day limitations period, would be equitable as the plain­
tiff would have had sufficient time to complete the myriad of 
requirements of the in forma pauperis statute and Title VII. If the 
plaintiff were not diligent, denying the application of tolling, which 
precludes consideration of the merits, would not appear to be so 
harsh.307 
3. Alternate Recommendations 
Without an amendment to Rule 15(c) or to the Title VII limita­
tions period, Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiffs will continue to 
seek application of equitable tolling in an effort to amend their com­
plaints where they have named the improper Title VII defendant. 
Misnomers in these cases are bound to occur due to the probability 
that the plaintiff has dealt with the agency as defendant during the 
306. See. e.g., Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1989) (con­
structive notice doctrine of Title VII suits against private employers applicable to suits 
against the federal government because there is "no reason to believe Congress intended a 
different result in suits against the government than in suits against private employers"), 
aff'd, III S. Ct. 453 (1990). 
307. See. e.g., Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 113 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Colo. 
1986), aff'd, 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). 
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administrative process. 308 When applying the doctrine of tolling, 
courts should be reminded of the remedial purpose of the in forma 
pauperis statute and Title VII.309 Viewing the cases in this light, 
greater weight should be accorded plaintiff reliance on the procedures 
of the court rather than on diligence. 
The meaning of diligence and determining whether a plaintiff has 
been diligent is open to debate. One definition of diligence, "the de­
gree of care and caution required by the circumstances of a person,"310 
opens the question as to what exactly is required when filing a com­
plaint in forma pauperis. In any diligence analysis a court must decide 
whether it will require filing on or before the final day of the limita­
tions period or whether diligence implies that filing must be made at 
some time before the final day. If a court should decide the latter, it 
must then decide how many days before the final day of the limitations 
period constitutes diligence. The ambiguities in defining diligence sug­
gest weighting reliance more heavily, especially when the plaintiff is 
prose and in forma pauperis. A layperson reading a statute should be 
required to comply only with the literal statutory requirements and 
not be expected to read between the lines to satisfy some heightened 
standard for the convenience of the court and the Marshal in serving 
the complaint. The statute does not say that the in forma pauperis 
plaintiff must file a complaint within twenty days, twenty-five days or 
some other number less than the thirty-day requirement. Unlike a pro 
se plaintiff, the courts and the Marshal are expected to be familiar with 
the law and the requirements for proper service. 
Reliance should receive special attention when the facts reveal 
that the plaintiff has made a good faith attempt to pursue the claim in 
a timely manner, as in Johnson. Emphasizing reliance in the tolling 
analysis may avoid the harsh result of Schiavone. 311 
308. ld. at 77. 
309. See supra text accompanying notes 211-14. 
310. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 554 (2d ed. 
1987). 
311. Arguably this result is consistent with Schiavone, noting the factual differences 
between the plaintiffs in Schiavone and the Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff. In Schia­
vone, the plaintiffs were represented by counsel, they had an extended limitations period of 
one year and they were not solely dependent upon the court and its officers to effect service. 
The Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff has only thirty days to file the in forma pauperis 
motion and complaint. Finally, the Title VII, in forma pauperis plaintiff is completely 
dependent on the court to effect service. As noted in Schiavone, there were no equities 
which would have led toward a more lenient position regarding the plaintiff's request to 
amend. Schiavone v. Fortune. 477 U.S. 21. 24-25 (1986). In contrast. the reliance of the 
Title VII. in forma pauperis plaintiff on the court and its processes indicates a balancing 
toward the plaintiff rather than against. 
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Prioritizing reliance in the tolling analysis serves to tip the bal­
ance of a fair application of Rule IS(c) back toward the plaintiff. One 
commentator has suggested that "the literal interpretation of [R]ule 
1 5 (c) creates a double standard under which a relation-back defendant 
possesses more rights than the original defendant."312 Since Rule 40) 
allows service of the complaint 120 days after filing,313 a properly 
named defendant may receive notice of the suit after expiration of the 
limitations period.314 However, in cases of misnomer: 
[After] Schiavone, a relation-back defendant must receive notice 
prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Thus, the added 
defendant not only benefits from a more stringent notice require­
ment than the original defendant, but also receives more rights than 
the law would provide had the original complaint designated the 
relation-back defendant as the proper party in the first instance.31s 
Logically, the presumption should be that in enacting the Title VII 
statute of limitations, the Congress balanced the competing concerns 
of plaintiffs and defendants. If a literal application of Rule IS(c) does 
give a relation-back defendant some advantage, the courts should not 
hesitate to balance this windfall back toward the pro se, in forma 
pauperis plaintiff by giving reliance the greater weight in the equitable 
tolling analysis.316 
CONCLUSION 
The interaction between Title VII, the in forma pauperis statute 
and Rule IS(c) results in a complicated procedural maze for the Title 
VII plaintiff attempting to sue the federal government. When the 
plaintiff errs and names the wrong Title VII defendant, the strict con­
struction of Rule IS(c), dictated by Schiavone v. Fortune, operates to 
trap the plaintiff in this maze precluding litigation of the merits. At 
the present time, the only method of escape from this trap is the use of 
equitable tolling of the Title VII limitations period to allow an 
312. Note, Threshold Requirement, supra note 56, at 603. 
313. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j). For the text of Rule 4(j), see supra note 100. 
314. Note, Threshold Requirement, supra note 56, at 603; see also Brussack, supra 
note 56, at 682-83. 
315. Note, Threshold Requirement, supra note 56, at 603 (citations omitted); see also 
Brussack, supra note 56, at 683, 688. 
316. In the case of the plaintiff who is not proceeding in forma pauperis and is repre­
sented by counsel, there are probably few equities which would warrant any application of 
tolling. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 24-25 (1986). Hence, in the absence of any 
change in Rule 15(c), Schiavone applies and the relation-back defendant continues to enjoy 
rights superior to the defendant who is properly named within the limitations period. See 
generally Note, Threshold Requirement, supra note 56. 
268 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND iAw REVIEW [Vol. 13:225 
amended complaint to relate back to the date of the original pleading. 
Unfortunately for the in forma pauperis plaintiff, equitable tolling will 
not always be allowed unless the plaintiff has met all the requirements 
of a multi-step tolling analysis. An amendment to Rule lS(c), an ex­
tension of the Title VII limitations period, or a policy of judicial leni­
ency in the application of tolling would offer the Title VII, in forma 
pauperis plaintiffs who have named the incorrect defendant an oppor­
tunity to pursue the merits of their claims. 
Sandra L. Cordes- Vaughan 
